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BOOK REVIEW
TOTAL JUSTICE. By Lawrence M. Friedman.

Russell Sage Foundation. 1985. Pages 166 (hardback).
Reviewed by Professor Jeremy M. Miller*
In a book released some time after its copyright date, Stanford
law professor Lawrence M. Friedman offers perhaps the most palatable and digestible apologia for the liberal/welfare state ever written. As a result of this pleasing craftsmanship, Total Justice is
readable, thought-provoking, and intellectually tempting. Nevertheless, Friedman offers us a society of stagnation where the individual
is protected only by the dictates of a somehow ever-beneficent big
government.
This volume was commissioned by the Russell Sage Foundation,

in commemoration of its seventy-fifth anniversary. The foundation,

in their own words, is a "general purpose"' foundation, taking no
view on particular areas. The foundation's claim of neutrality echoes
a similar claim by Friedman regarding the topics of his book: "I
leave the question of good or bad open. The tone here has been
' 2
mainly descriptive.
Nevertheless, Friedman imprints on his writing not just the law he
describes, but also his own views. Scholarship, especially legal scholarship, is a kind of politics. 3 In criticism, therefore, even prior to
reviewing the substance of Professor Friedman's thesis, his and his
sponsor's notion of political neutrality is thoroughly specious. This,
of course, is not to condemn the particular theories of Mr. Friedman.
Rather, it is to label them as what they are: political philosophy.
The book begins by stating the axiomatic: there has been an
explosion of law in the United States. Friedman writes, "lawyers...
seem to be multiplying like rabbits." ' 4 He notes further that complex
legal notions have become commonplace to the average American
citizen. Newspapers contain innumerable references to the law with
* Professor, Western State University College of Law, Fullerton, CA. B.A. Yale, J.D.
Tulane, LL.M. University of Pennsylvania.
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legal angles included in every story. The amount of litigation appears
to be skyrocketing. 5
Friedman paraphrases the criticism of this phenomenon: there is
too much law, too many rules, too much government, and as a result
our society will lose its freedoms. 6 In Chapter 2, Professor Friedman
states in more detail the above criticisms of the United States legal
climate. However, at each turn he contests those criticisms-again,
in a gentle, palatable way. For example, when discussing the litigation
explosion, Friedman queries, "What would such an explosion look
like, and how would we know one if we saw one? ...

The answer

' '7
is far from clear.
The utterly overburdened state and federal dockets, together with
repeated requests by ranking federal judges to create more judgeships
and more courts offer rebuttal to Friedman's point. Factually speaking there is a law and litigation explosion.
In subsequent chapters Friedman avoids the questionable arguments, as above, and moves on to the main point of his book. The
increased importance given to law, he theorizes, is an inevitable result
of society's changes. 8 Our society is no longer tightly knit, nor is it

a society of a "radical individualist ...

frontiersman."

labor."' 1

9

Instead,

modem society is characterized by "division of
Modern society therefore fosters tremendous "dependence on people we do not know."" Law, then, and government offer people
protection from the unseen impersonal masses with whom they must
2
deal in order to survive. Big government is thus a necessity.
The thesis of Friedman's book, incidentally, if not already apparent, can be fairly summarized as follows. The increased emphasis in
law is a necessary correlate of a dramatically larger and more
technological society. Because the wonders of modern science have
cured so many physical ills and so significantly improved the quality
of life, people have grown to expect more from life. In fact, there
has arisen a collective desire for "total justice." The means of
obtaining this total justice are by utilization of the legal system.
Utilization of the legal system translates into increased government
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

10.
11.
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and private liabilities for any and all wrongs befalling any and all.
The best parts of the book occur where Friedman is truly descriptive. Friedman traces the development in tort law, showing, for
example, how juries now award greater damages. 3 He also discusses
worker's compensation, which, even more significantly, did away
with "fault" as a bar to recovery.' 4 Friedman ultimately labels this
emerging system the welfare state: The government acts as an insurer
15
of all its people.
Chapter five is entitled, "The Due Process Revolution." In this
chapter Friedman gives the legal enzyme by which many of the
above-noted changes-and others-have taken place. Due process has
both state and federal applicability. As Friedman correctly notes,
due process has come to mean an individualized expectation of
fairness both from the government and from the private sector. Such
fairness includes heretofore unincluded military rights,'16 prisoner
rights, 7 student rights, 8 and of course the liberalization of sexual
rights for both sexes. 19
In developing his thesis, Friedman subtly counters the conservative
fear that all of the above means a loss of individuality and its
accordant rights. For one, people are now allowed to be more free
because of the "safety nets" of the modern welfare state. 20 Further,
whatever de minimis losses there may be are outweighed by increased
equality (for the races, the sexes, etc.). 2'
Near the end of the book Friedman has difficulty in shielding his
own opinions. He phrases all issues such that they beg for his one
answer: big government overseeing all. For example, he states that
there is a distaste for overregulation, but then he amicably offers a
counter proof. What are better, the previously racist rules of the
private sector, or the now just laws enacted by the government?22
He concludes, "I have to confess my personal sense of pleasure over
many of the developments ... I like the welfare state.'"'
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Aside from Professor Friedman's sugarcoating of hard issues, his
book and thesis raise other fundamental criticisms. An often quoted
Greek medical aphorism states: "Perfection is the enemy of good."
Aristotle, in similar classical reasoning, argued that the best approach
was one of moderation.
Friedman, however does not adhere to these perennial philosophies.
Picture-perfect, exacting anything is not possible. Those who attempt
it either produce nothing or fail in trying.
Brilliantly, Friedman characterizes our American system as seeking
a "total justice." Then, in disappointingly anemic academic manner,
he argues that this is a good thing. If what Professor Friedman
perceives were to continue, all of the good laws, too, would be
dismantled in the frenzy. The fallacies of the view that government
is the cure for all individual human weaknesses are twofold. First,
government is but individuals with power, and second, what is the
cure when that all-powerful government misbehaves? Friedman, in
his fervent love of modern social science, forgets all history. Governments, from the time of Socrates, to the religious persecutions,
to mass-murder have been more often the force of corruption.
Power vested in government can be used for good, as Friedman
suggests, but it can be used as easily for ill. And, power once vested
in government has great difficulty in unvesting. Thus Friedman's
approach, a characterization of big, all-encroaching government as
"total justice," is patently immoderate.
Of course, government must oversee and offer protections to the
downtrodden. But, in the present fevered litigious quest for damages
(Friedman's "Justice"), an appetite in government, itself, is being
fed. "Total justice" will not lead to a maximization of individual
fulfillment, but to a loss in the respect given to the individual.
Besides his immoderate suggestion that a plethora of government
rules will cure all ills, Friedman also misstates a fundamental tension.
Friedman argues that both the great legal values of liberty and
equality will be maximized by the welfare state. However, as Alexis
24
de Tocqueville noted long ago, liberty and equality often conflict.
Equality is a great thing, but when such value is used to "level"
all of society and intrude in even the most private choices, that
equality has destroyed liberty. Friedman's approach is immoderate
here as well.
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The worst part of this approach is that when it is followed, a
reverse pendulum shift becomes inevitable. Is not the overzealous big
government approach Friedman defends responsible for the overly
conservative legal retractions of procedural rights in the 1980s? Did
not Earl Warren create William Rehnquist?
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